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Abstract
When a crisis develops, what sort of governance—what sort of system for running society—is most resilient?
Does centralized control give the best prospect of survival? Or is something more decentralized needed?
Possible political sources of crisis include military invasion, internal coups, political paralysis, major
corruption, and revolutionary change. Wars in the past century triggered changes in governance in countries
such as Germany, Japan, and Cambodia. Coups affected dozens of countries, from Chile to Greece.
Revolutions transformed Russia, China, and Iran.
At least as significant are changes enabled by belief systems. The spread of neoliberalism—based on belief in
unfettered markets—has transformed political systems, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom,
and other English-speaking countries. Belief in political freedoms and fair elections has underpinned
challenges to repressive regimes in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Belief in racial equality was
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When a crisis develops, what sort of governance - what sort of
system for running society - is most resilient? Does centralized
control give the best prospect of survival? Or is something more
decentralized needed?[1]
Possible political sources of crisis include military invasion,
internal coups, political paralysis, major corruption, and
revolutionary change. Wars in the past century triggered changes
in governance in countries such as Germany, Japan, and
Cambodia. Coups affected dozens of countries, from Chile to
Greece. Revolutions transformed Russia, China, and Iran.
At least as significant are changes enabled by belief systems. The
spread of neoliberalism - based on belief in unfettered markets -
has transformed political systems, especially in the United States,
the United Kingdom, and other English-speaking countries. Belief
in political freedoms and fair elections has underpinned
challenges to repressive regimes in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and
elsewhere. Belief in racial equality was behind the successful
struggle against apartheid in South Africa.
Environmental impacts intersect with political and economic
systems and crises in various ways. Disasters with environmental
impacts can affect politics, as when the devastation from the 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami encouraged the signing of a peace
agreement in Indonesia's war-torn province of Aceh.
Governments can influence responses to crises with
environmental impacts, as when the Burmese government
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hindered international relief efforts following the devastating
2008 cyclone Nargis. Some types of political and economic
systems are more prone to contributing to environmental
problems, and some systems are better at responding to emerging
or full-blown environmental crises.[2]
War, which can be considered a type of political crisis, is
devastating to humans and the environment and in fact can be a
source of environmental crisis. Massive refugee movements -
themselves a source of political crisis - can be triggered by war
and political repression but also by environmental disasters.
Global warming has the potential of creating huge numbers of
"environmental migrants."[3]
Resilience is the capacity of a system to respond effectively to
assaults like these on its functioning or very existence. Resilience
in the case of communication technology includes the capacity to
keep functioning despite breakdowns or attack: the Internet was
originally designed, remember, to maintain communication in the
face of nuclear attack. The resilience of political systems includes
both the survival and the maintenance of formal decisionmaking
processes and of associated systems - such as transport, food, and
communication - for maintaining the survival and social
functioning of the population.[4]
When considering responses to crises, it is useful to distinguish
two contrasting sorts of governance: stiff and flexible. Stiff
governance can be well suited for a particular task, often for a
particular threat. The classic example is a dictatorship with a
command economy, ideally designed for warfare: central direction
can be used to mobilize resources for defense or attack. Such a
system can have great difficulty dealing with other sorts of threats,
however. A command economy cannot innovate easily because the
initiative of the populace is suppressed, which means that
retooling for a different sort of threat - economic competition, for
instance, or a shortage of liquid fuels - is more difficult.
Flexible governance, in contrast, is based on the capacity to adapt,
improvise, and change directions. It may not be ideally designed
for any specific threat, but it is able to deal credibly with a variety
of threats. In general, systems based on participation, high skill
levels, robust debate, and mutual respect are more likely to be
flexible.
Command systems might seem to have a greater capacity to
respond to a new type of threat because the people in command
can simply direct people and resources to deal with it. But these
systems have several inherent difficulties in actually doing this.
Because relatively few people have an input into decisionmaking,
there is lower capacity to recognize novel threats and to innovate
against them. Subjects - those who are expected to follow orders -
are typically less than enthusiastic in obeying. Finally, change can
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be threatening to those with power and privilege, so maintaining
the relations of power can become more important than making
sure the system survives.
An example of stiff governance is China in the 1950s, with a
command economy driven by political ideology. The Great Leap
Forward, launched in 1957, was an attempt to accelerate economic
development. But the result was a vast famine that killed tens of
millions of people and caused massive destruction of property and
damage to the environment. The political system was incapable of
responding to the catastrophe it created. Had there been a more
flexible, open system in China, with independent media, things
might have turned out differently. Countries with a flexible
governance system are far less susceptible to famine because
leaders are under greater pressure to respond to emerging crises.
In essence, there is a feedback mechanism to stimulate political
responses to a crisis, preventing cover-up and making inaction
untenable.[5]
Centralized rule thus can be a threat in itself as well as an obstacle
to responding to other sorts of threats. Fiji was a thriving
multicultural democracy when, in 1987, there were two military
coups. The result was mobilization of racism, emigration of skilled
professionals, decline in the economy, general cultural stagnation,
and ongoing political instability.[6]
Lessons from Civil Resistance
The history of civil resistance against repressive regimes reveals
features that raise the odds of governance systems responding
effectively to technological or political threats. The power of a
mobilized citizenry is dramatically revealed in popular challenges
to autocratic governments through demonstrations, strikes,
boycotts, sit-ins, and other forms of protest, but without physical
violence. This method of struggle is called nonviolent action, civil
resistance, or "people power." In country after country, repressive
rulers have succumbed to people power, for example in the
Philippines in 1986, Eastern Europe in 1989, and Egypt in 2011.
In these dramatic episodes, large numbers of people protested by
using rallies, strikes, boycotts, and a host of other techniques,
usually with little or no violence by the protesters.[7]
Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, in a path-breaking study
of people-power movements between 1900 and 2006, showed that
regime-change and anti-occupation nonviolent movements are
more likely to be successful than armed movements in achieving
their goals when facing similarly repressive opponents. (See Table
XX-1.) They also found that success is more likely when large
numbers of people are mobilized and when protesters are
innovative tactically and strategically. When more people are
actively involved, there is a greater capacity to try out creative
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ideas for resistance, which are needed to counter new repressive
moves by the government. Greater participation needs to be
accompanied by an ethos of inclusiveness, so that diverse groups
can support the common cause. Groups with skills in many areas
- including communication, organization, finance, languages,
persuasion, and psychology - are valuable to help the movement
operate effectively and survive attacks. If, for example, the
movement depends on a single sector, such as students, it is easier
for the government to repress or co-opt it. Wider participation
provides a greater capacity for learning. This also provides a
better basis for a stable, free society if the movement is successful
in toppling a ruler.[8]
Table 25-1. Outcomes of Violent and Nonviolent
























Success 27 59 36 35 10 0
Limited
success
12 24 10 41 22 0
Failure 61 17 54 24 68 100
Source: Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil
Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 73.
People power can be used to resist coups, as happened in
Germany in 1920, Algeria in 1961, and the Soviet Union in 1991.
In each case, the key was the willingness of large numbers of
people to take action - without using violence. In contrast, armed
resistance to coups easily degenerates into civil war, which is a
different sort of crisis, and a highly damaging one.[9]
Flexible Governance
Flexible governance means that there are methods for making and
implementing decisions affecting entire communities in ways that
enable rapid adaptation to new situations. This form of
governance virtually requires flexible technological systems, which
typically are modular, adaptable, and low cost.
In the energy sector, the best example of a rigid, inflexible
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technology is nuclear power, with its high capital cost, long lead
times for construction, large unit sizes, and potential for causing
environmental catastrophe through reactor accidents, terrorist
attacks, or the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Because of its
scale and potential risk, nuclear power requires special security
measures, which in turn limit the possibility for citizen
participation. Introduction of a "plutonium economy" based on
the nuclear fuel cycle would drastically limit flexibility in both
energy systems and governance.[10]
Small-scale renewable energy systems are better matched to
flexible governance. Community-level solar and wind systems are
relatively low cost, quick to construct, and small in scale, with
only a small potential for environmental risk: for example,
terrorists are unlikely to attack them. These features mean that
communities are less locked in to the technology and, just as
important, that corporate and government commitments to the
system are less entrenched.[11]
Most technologies are intermediate in scale between nuclear
power and a solar hot water heater, but the same sort of analysis
applies: technologies with lower unit costs and lower potential
risks to health and the environment are usually also more
amenable to citizen control. In short, flexible technological
systems are well suited to flexible governance.
The experience of people power against repression provides a
template for the sort of governance most likely to be effective in
crises. There are four key features.
•  Participation of significant numbers of people. Significant
participation is essential for rapidly responding to crises. People's
commitment comes from being involved in decisionmaking and
feeling part of the solution. Genuine participation is greatest when
power is shared. Governance with extensive participation goes
under various names, including participatory democracy, self-
management, workers' control, and neighborhood power.[12]
•  Resources, including food, transport, and especially
communication. Resources, including material and technological
resources, need to be available and ready. A society needs to have
the capacity to deal with future contingencies rather than putting
all its resources into one development path.
•  Openness, tolerance, and inclusion, with involvement of many
different sectors of the population. Openness, tolerance, and
inclusion are necessary to be able to mobilize the entire society to
meet the challenge. When significant groups are opposed to
action, this can paralyze efforts. The governance form most suited
to inclusion is consensus, sometimes called unitary democracy, in
contrast to representative government, which can be called
adversary democracy. But just as electoral systems require
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innovation and modification to address problems such as voting
fraud, consensus systems require experience, testing, and
innovation to address problems such as entrenched resistance to a
near-unanimous agreement. There is now considerable experience
with consensus-building processes.[13]
•  Learning skills for struggle and developing strategic acumen.
Skills and strategic acumen are needed to be effective in
responding to threats intelligently rather than in an instinctive,
unreflective way. Strategic insight is most likely to flourish in a
form of governance that gives considerable autonomy to smaller
units, while enabling communication between them so that
insights can be shared, tested, and applied.
These four features are mutually supportive. Widespread
participation is necessary for collective change or response, but it
needs to be coordinated, hence the need for communication
infrastructure and skills. Strategy can be more adaptable when
there is openness to participation by a wide diversity of
individuals with different perspectives and recognition that their
perspectives and ideas may be worthwhile.
Openness, tolerance, and inclusion include forging links with
sectors of the population often seen to be part of the problem. In a
military coup, soldiers are at the heart of the threat. People-power
resistance requires winning over some of the soldiers, weakening
their resolve or convincing them to join the opposition. Armed
resistance is counterproductive for this purpose when it
stimulates unity within the regime, as often occurs. By analogy, in
dealing with other sorts of threats, tactics need to be chosen that
win over some people normally seen as being on the "other side,"
whether corporate elites, government personnel, or security
forces.[14]
Adding these elements together, the form of governance most
promising for responding to threats will have significant citizen
participation in decisionmaking, will allocate ample resources for
communication and contingencies, will include diverse groups in
the population, and will allow decentralized yet coordinated
action.
Transforming Governance
Rather than try to describe this flexible form of governance -
which can quickly degenerate into arguments about preferred
models - it is useful to look instead at methods for moving toward
these four elements. In other words, rather than fixating on the
desirable end state, which might not be knowable anyway, it is
worth turning each of the elements of flexible governance into
methods for transforming governance.
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Significant Participation. Initiatives to foster participation
can be taken at all levels. Within local groups - including formal
associations from sports clubs to churches and informal groups -
leaders and members can foster greater participation. Local
governments can introduce various forms of citizen participation.
Companies can promote worker participation.
One of the most promising initiatives is the movement for
"deliberative democracy," which includes experiments in direct
decisionmaking by citizens on important policy issues. An
example is inviting a randomly selected group of 12 to 25 citizens
to address a policy issue over a period of several days, reading
materials, hearing from experts and partisans, and developing
recommendations, under the guidance of neutral facilitators.
Called planning cells or citizens juries, hundreds of such exercises
have been held in various countries, including Australia, Britain,
Germany and the United States. Many such deliberative-
democracy initiatives are taking place below the radar of
mainstream politics and the mass media, so few people realize
how much of this activity is occurring.[15]
In crises, opportunities can exist for dramatically increased
participation. Historically, there are numerous examples of
popular participation in crisis situations, such as in Paris in 1871,
Russia in 1917, Spain in the late 1930s, and France in 1968 . These
revolutions of popular control were all crushed by the state, but
they do show the possibility for citizens to reorganize
decisionmaking at short notice.[16]
In contrast, after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 there
was a rapid transition to predatory capitalism involving massive
corruption: popular mobilization was restricted to resisting a coup
rather than creating a participatory alternative. This suggests the
importance of local initiatives that build the foundation for a
genuinely participatory alternative.[17]
In Argentina following the 1999 economic collapse and the
freezing of bank assets in December 2001, in a surge of local
initiatives workers took over failed businesses and communities
made decisions in neighborhood assemblies. The Argentine
initiatives have succeeded more than some previous ones, perhaps
because there was less of an attempt to take over the state and
more emphasis on creating a living alternative.[18]
Environmental movements can contribute to transforming
governance through the way they operate. When movements are
made up of many local groups that foster participation - for
example, through consensus decisionmaking - and are not
dominated by central offices and paid staff, they are ideally poised
to react quickly and creatively to existing and new crises. They
also provide a model of flexible governance.
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Resources for Struggle. Promoting the development of
resources for any struggle is an ongoing process in which many
groups are involved. The movement for appropriate technology -
typically small-scale, low-cost, locally produced, and locally
managed technology for energy, agriculture, transport, and other
sectors - is a model for building resources that support resilient
governance. Communities using appropriate technology are better
able to survive in the face of economic or physical-system
collapse: they can rely on their own resources without excessive
dependence on imports or specialist skills.[19]
The Transition Towns movement, motivated by preparation for a
looming shortage of cheap liquid fuels and the impacts of climate
change, combines local participation in planning with the
promotion of community resilience, including local production of
food, energy, and housing. In this model, resources for struggle
are developed as part of the struggle itself.[20]
In the communication sector, the key is the ability to maintain
communication in a crisis. The technology for network
communication is becoming ever more developed with the
Internet, Web 2.0, and social media. These provide powerful tools
for rapidly and flexibly responding to emergencies, and when
people gain practice in coordinating responses, this has relevance
for both political and environmental crises.
Working against this ability are governments and corporations
that seek to limit communication freedom, for example through
censorship, surveillance, and controls over innovation in the guise
of intellectual property. If governments can shut down or restrict
the Internet for political purposes - has happened in Egypt in
2011, among other places - and use digital surveillance techniques
to track dissidents, the ability and willingness of citizens to
coordinate against threats, whether political or environmental,
will be reduced. The struggle for free communication can be
considered an essential part of the struggle for more flexible
governance.[21]
Openness, Tolerance, and Inclusion. Movements that
polarize society, turning some groups into enemies, contribute to
stiff governance. U.S. foreign and domestic policies have done
this. Foreign military interventions such as in Afghanistan and
Iraq, with civilian deaths as "collateral damage," create enmity
and enemies and then, when foreign groups retaliate, become
justifications for further interventions. The domestic response to
9/11, which involved labeling terrorists as enemies to be
destroyed, did little to include a range of groups in a struggle
against the roots of terrorism. In this context, efforts to promote
tolerance and inclusion - nationally and internationally - are
important in moving toward flexible governance.[22]
One of the biggest challenges ahead is growing economic
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inequality, leading to disenfranchisement of all but the wealthy.
Responding to economic, resource, or political crises will be much
more difficult in societies divided into haves and have-nots. This
suggests that movements for greater economic equality can, as a
side effect, help build resilience. The Occupy Movement has put
the issue of inequality on the popular and political agenda, but it
remains to be seen if this can slow or reverse the continuing
increase in inequality stimulated by corporate globalization.
Pervasive corruption is a major obstacle to good governance. One
of the most powerful tools against corruption is nonviolent action;
some popular challenges to repressive regimes, such as in Egypt
in 2011, have been stimulated by opposition to high-level
corruption. Political and economic systems that permit fair
participation by a wide range of groups rather than siphoning
spoils to the ruling elite are more likely to lead to prosperity.
Inclusion thus is a key to greater commitment in addressing social
problems.[23]
Learning Skills for Struggle and Developing Strategic
Acumen. Numerous initiatives and movements around the world
foster greater skills for satisfying human needs, from agriculture
to software development. A prime example is the open source
movement, building software and other products that draw on
contributions from numerous volunteers. Another example is the
ever-increasing information and tools for learning available on the
Internet, enabling learning outside of institutions. Community
renewable energy projects foster learning of practical skills; the
Danish community wind-power movement in the 1970s did this
while sparking development of what is now a major industry. Also
relevant are self-help groups - for example, addressing particular
diseases or experiences ranging from breast cancer to having a
family member in prison. There are a growing number of activist
handbooks and activist training programs.[24]
As more and more people increase their education (formal and
informal) and engage in civic initiatives (face-to-face or online),
skills and strategic flexibility increase. Especially relevant for this
are initiatives to give experience in governance, such as
participatory budgeting, pioneered in cities in Brazil. In a typical
process of participatory budgeting, multiple citizen assemblies
discuss priorities, and then a participatory budget council, with
representatives from the assemblies, deliberates on priorities,
negotiating between the assemblies and the city
administration.[25]
In a Crisis
International governance is particularly unsuited for dealing with
crises. The United Nations might give the appearance of having a
centralized response capability, but in reality it is the tool of
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powerful governments that have their own agendas. There is little
citizen participation and little capacity for skill development. The
result is a form of symbolic politics that gives only the illusion of
authority and response capacity.[26]
In Rwanda in 1994, for example, when mass killings commenced,
western governments pulled out their citizens, thereby removing
sources of information on and witnesses of human rights
violations. The United Nations Security Council dithered and then
withdrew most U.N. peacekeepers. In this case, international
governments utterly failed to avert or confront a genocide in
which over half a million people were killed.[27]
Rapidly developing crises are obvious and hence are more likely
to stimulate responses. Far more challenging are slow-moving
crises, which escape attention but can cause just as much damage.
An example is the oil spill in Guadalupe Dunes, California, which
released as much oil as in the famous 1989 Exxon Valdez spill but
which is virtually unknown. Because it happened more slowly,
over decades, people in the region accommodated the Guadalupe
Dunes oil releases, psychologically and socially.[28]
Climate change is the most prominent slow-moving crisis. As in
the case of war and genocide, many governments and
international bodies have provided only symbolic gestures. By far
the most effective response has come from grassroots groups and
local governments, indicating the importance of participation in
dealing with environmental crises.
Moving toward Flexible Governance
Governance is often seen as a comprehensive package: an entire
system, operating according to a consistent set of principles,
whether it be dictatorship, representative government, or a
modern-day plutocracy in which the rich rule via captive
politicians. Any such pure system of governance would be suited
for one set of conditions but be vulnerable to sudden changes.
However, actual systems in the world today are mixed. The United
States, for example, could be considered a combination of
representative government, plutocracy, a security state, and
pockets of participatory democracy ranging from cooperatives to
the free software movement. Governance in practice contains
rigidities, capacities, and possibilities.
In the face of threats and crises - political, economic, and
resource-based - the most promising sort of governance is flexible,
able to draw on widespread participation and an abundance of
human and material resources. The inclusion of different groups
provides a greater diversity of knowledge and experience for
meeting challenges. Whether or not there is an ideal system with
all these characteristics, it is possible to move in the direction of
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flexible governance by taking initiatives that support participation,
resources for struggle, inclusion, and skills development.
In responding to environmental and resource crises, activists
usually focus primarily on the immediate issues - trying to stop
logging, for example, or the burning of fossil fuels and other
damaging activities. To maximize long-term effectiveness, it is
valuable to complement these actions with efforts to transform
governance, as otherwise the same problems will recur. Ideally,
responses to environmental problems should themselves
incorporate the elements of flexible governance, so that current
actions can help create the sort of institutions that are more
capable of dealing with problems and preventing them in the first
place.
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